The Argument of Humanity as an End in Itself in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Abstract

Recent debates on the humanity formula of the categorical imperative attempt to understand the conceptual inputs of this formula on the basis of Kantian works which are not the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals itself. This procedure is based on the false assumption that in the GMS there is no clear or concrete meaning of what is embodied in terms such as humanity (Mensch) or end in itself (Zweck an sich selbst). By virtue of the above, in this paper, I will seek to analyse carefully and in detail what Kant has to say concretely in GMS AA IV 427₁₉-428_33, since there is an argumentation that builds progressively from the notion of end to the equivalence of rational nature as an end in itself, which I consider to be central to a proper understanding of the formula of humanity presented later.